This paper considers two distinct procedures to lexicographically compose multiple criteria for social or individual decision making. The first procedure composes M binary relations into one, and then selects its maximal elements. The second procedure first selects the set of maximal elements of the first binary relation, and then within that set, chooses the maximal elements of the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the M th binary relation. We show several distinct sets of conditions for the choice functions representing these two procedures to satisfy non-emptiness and choice-consistency conditions such as contraction consistency (Chernoff, 1954) and path independence (Arrow, 1963) . We also examine the relationships between the outcomes of the two procedures. Then, we investigate under what conditions the outcomes of each procedure are independent of the order of lexicographic application of the criteria. Examples for applications of the results in the economic environments are also presented.
Introduction
In the process of social decision making, people often advocate multiple criteria on which the desirability of alternatives should be judged. A typical example is the equity-efficiency trade-off. People say that economic growth is desirable because the welfare of most individuals increases, while at the same time they insist that an equitable distribution is essential for social stability. As often argued, however, economic growth may give rise to an inequitable distribution of income and wealth.
Even a single individual's decision may be based upon multiple criteria. As Sen (1985) argues, an individual has not only material preferences over his own consumptions but also has value judgments based on, for instance, the sense of obligation, which may contradict his material preferences. A family's decision also typically involves multiple criteria. Parents' interest often conflicts with children's interest on, for example, video games.
When multiple criteria, each regarded as reasonable for itself, are in contradiction with each other, one resolution would be to make a priority order for application of the criteria. For such lexicographic applications of multiple criteria, however, we can consider two distinct procedures of choice, which are described in the following. Let us first postulate that each criterion is expressed by a binary relation on the set X of all alternatives. In the first procedure, which we call procedure α, we first compose lexicographically multiple binary relations R . By contrast, in the second procedure, which we call procedure β, for each subset S of alternatives, we first choose the set C P (R 1 ) (S) of maximal elements in S for the first criterion R 1 , and then select within the set C P (R 1 ) (S), its subset C P (R 2 ) [C P (R 1 ) (S)] of maximal elements for the second criterion R 2 , and iterate the procedure until the M th binary relation. Indeed, the above two procedures provide different choices for many cases. As a simple example, consider S = {x, y, z}, R 1 = {(x, z)}, and R 2 = {(z, y)}. Then, since (x, z), (z, y) ∈ P (R 1 , R 2 ), procedure α chooses {x} from S. However, because the set of maximal elements in S for R 1 is {x, y}, and neither x nor y strictly dominates the other according to R 2 , procedure β selects {x, y} from S. Procedure α has been introduced and examined by Tadenuma (2002 Tadenuma ( , 2005 , while procedure β has been introduced by Suzumura (1983b) , Aizerman (1985) and Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) , and studied more recently by Manzini and Mariotti (2005) , Tadenuma (2005) and Houy (2007) .
When a decision-maker has multiple criteria, his behavior becomes much different from a simple maximizer of a single binary relation. It is more difficult to have consistent choices under multiple criteria than under a single criterion. In this paper, we study under what conditions the choice correspondence derived from each procedure to lexicographically compose multiple criteria satisfy non-emptiness and various properties of choice-consistency such as contraction consistency (Chernoff, 1954) and path independence (Arrow, 1963) . We also examine relationships between the outcomes of procedures α and β.
Another interesting question would be whether the final outcome depends on the order of application of the multiple criteria. When we evaluate allocations, which criterion should we apply first, the efficiency criterion or the equity criterion? Such a question is important if the order of application of the multiple criteria affects the final outcome. But if the order is irrelevant, then we do not have to be concerned about which criterion we should take first. We investigate under what conditions the outcomes of the choice correspondence of each procedure are independent of the order of lexicographic application of the multiple criteria.
All the results in this paper are derived without specific restrictions on the set of alternatives, but we present applications of the results in the classical division problem of infinitely divisible commodities.
There are many examples in which multiple criteria, each of which seems reasonable for itself, contradict each other. In economics and social choice theory, the social preference relation that has been most widely accepted is the Pareto domination. However, the Pareto criterion is silent about the distributional equity of allocations but concerns only efficient use of resources. On the other hand, several interesting concepts of distributional equity have been introduced and extensively studied in economics. Two of them are central: no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence.
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It was Kolm (1972) and Feldman and Kirman (1974) who pointed out that there is a fundamental conflict between the Pareto criterion and the equity-as-no-envy criterion: there often exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y whereas x is not envy-free but y is. The same kind of conflict also arises between the Pareto criterion and the equity-as-egalitarian-equivalence criterion.
Social choice theory on abstract domains has also been extended to take account of intersituational comparisons of individuals.
2
In this "extended sympathy" approach, Suzumura (1981a, b) studied choice-consistency of social choice functions satisfying some conditions concerning Pareto efficiency and equity-as-no-envy in the framework of abstract social choice. Tadenuma (2002 Tadenuma ( , 2005 introduced various lexicographic compositions of the Pareto criterion and the no-envy criterion, and of Pareto and egalitarian-equivalence, respectively, in the classical division problem, and examined rationality of the social preference relations. Tadenuma (2005) also showed that the set of allocations selected by procedure α with the Pareto criterion and the egalitarianequivalence criterion from the set of all feasible allocations is independent of the order of lexicographic application of the two criteria, and that the essential reason for this independence is because the set of allocation selected by procedure β is also independent of the order of application.
The present paper generalizes the results in these works by showing general conditions for non-emptiness, contraction consistency, and path independence of choice functions representing procedures α and β, clarifying their relationships, and also deriving conditions for independence of the order of application of multiple criteria.
The next section defines the basic notions and notation, and Section 3 introduces the choice-consistency properties. In Sections 4 and 5, we investigate conditions for non-emptiness and choice-consistency of procedure α and procedure β, respectively. Section 6 examines order-independence of each of the two procedures. The final section contains some concluding remarks.
Basic Definitions and Notation
Let X be a (finite or infinite) set of alternatives with |X| ≥ 3. Let X denote the set of all finite subsets of X. A binary relation on X is a set R ⊆ X × X. The set of all binary relations on X is denoted R.
• transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R imply (x, z) ∈ R;
• quasi-transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ P (R) and (y, z) ∈ P (R) imply (x, z) ∈ P (R);
• asymmetric if for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R implies (y, x) / ∈ R;
• acyclic if there exists no cycle for R.
Note that acyclicity implies asymmetry by the above definitions.
In the rest of the paper, if (x 1 , . . . , x K ) ⊆ X is a cycle, we abuse notation by letting (K + 1) := 1 in order to simplify presentation of the results.
A choice function is a function C : X → X such that C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ X . Given R ∈ R, we define the choice function C P (R) as the one selecting the set of maximal elements for every S ∈ X , that is,
We say that a choice function C is rationalizable by a binary relation R ∈ R if C = C P (R) .
In the following, we often consider the classical division problem with n agents and m infinitely divisible commodities defined as follows. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents. The consumption set of each agent is R m + . Let R E be the set of complete, transitive and strictly monotonic 3 relations on R m + . Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with a preference relation i ∈ R E . The associated strict preference relation and the indifference relation are defined as above, and denoted i and ∼ i , respectively. An allocation is a vector
is the consumption bundle of agent i ∈ N . The set of alternatives in this division problem is defined as X = R mn + .
Choice-Consistency Properties
In this section, we introduce some desirable properties of choice functions. A very basic requirement is that at least one alternative should be chosen from any set.
Non-Emptiness: For all S ∈ X , C(S) = ∅. Our next three properties require "consistency" of choices in related situations. The first choice-consistency property means that if the set of available alternatives "shrinks" but previously chosen alternatives are still available, then those alternatives should remain chosen. This is a fundamental requirement of choice-consistency, and it is satisfied by any choice function that is rationalizable by some binary relation.
Contraction Consistency (Chernoff, 1954) 
The second property requires "the independence of the final choice from the path to it" (Arrow, 1963, p.120) . In real choice situations, we often divide the set of alternatives into several parts in the first round, and make final choices from the alternatives that have survived in the first round. This property requires that the final choices should not depend on the way we divide the set of alternatives in the first round. It is an important property especially for social choice rules. Were it violated, some arbitrary agenda controls could affect the final choice, which is clearly undesirable.
It is well-known that Path Independence implies Contraction Consistency, but not vice versa.
The third choice-consistency property says that if an alternative is chosen from every pair containing it in the set S, then it should be chosen from S.
Condorcet Consistency: For all S ∈ X and all x ∈ S, if x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S, then x ∈ C(S).
The choice-consistency properties are related with rationalizability of the choice functions. The following results are well-established.
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Proposition 1 (Blair et al., 1976) A choice function C satisfies Non-Emptiness, Contraction Consistency and Condorcet Consistency if and only if it is rationalizable by a binary relation R such that P (R) is acyclic.
Given a binary relation R ∈ R, C P (R) satisfies Condorcet Consistency by definition. As we have noted, any choice function that is rationalizable by a binary relation satisfies Contraction Consistency. Hence, we have the following corollary. 
We examine under what conditions the choice function C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) satisfies NonEmptiness and Path Independence. By Corollaries 1 and 2, our examination reduces to checking acyclicity and quasi-transitivity of
. We also present examples for applications of the results in economic environments.
Our first result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for
) to be acyclic, and equivalently, for C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) to be non-empty.
is acyclic if and only if for every cycle
Proof. Necessity. Assume that there exists a cycle (
Sufficiency. Assume that for every cycle (
. By the assumption, there exists ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that for every m ∈ {1, . . . , M } with (y , y
In many economic problems, a trade-off arises between two criteria such as efficiency vs. equity, growth vs. environmental quality, efficiency vs. liberty, and so on. In such cases, we can obtain simpler conditions for acyclicity or quasi-transitivity of the lexicographic compositions of two binary relations. Next, we provide several sufficient conditions for P (R 1 , R 2 ) to be acyclic or quasi-transitive, which may be useful in various contexts. (2) and (3) (2) and (4) 
is complete and transitive, and R
There are many examples in allocation problems to which the above result can be applied. 
Example 1 Envy-free allocations. An allocation
The set H(x) is the set of all instances of envy at x. Following Feldman and Kirman (1974) A similar result can be obtained for acyclicity of
is complete and transitive, and
Proof. Assume that R 1 is complete and transitive, and P (R 2 ) is acyclic. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a cycle ( (Tadenuma, 2002 (Tadenuma, , 2005 . Notice that, since
The Pareto principle plays a central role in economics, but it says nothing about distributional equity. On the other hand, many binary relations based on some concepts of equity are complete and transitive. Suppose that we would like to socially rank allocations firstly by the Pareto principle, and secondly by an equity principle. When does such lexicographic applications of the Pareto and an equity principles generate an acyclic social preference relation? To answer the question, it is of special interest to investigate under what conditions P (R 1 , R 2 ) shows no cycle when R 1 ∈ R is only quasi-transitive and R 2 ∈ R is complete and transitive. Our next result gives an answer to this question.
To present the result, we define the following binary relation: for all x, y ∈ X,
That is, (x, y) ∈ Γ if and only if x and y are non-comparable or indifferent by the first criterion, and x is superior to y by the second criterion. Note that P (R
The relationships among any three alternatives in terms of these two components of P (R 
Proof. Assume that R 1 is quasi-transitive, that R 2 is complete and transitive, and that conditions (A) and (B) are satisfied. Suppose, on the contrary, that that
) be a cycle of the smallest cardinality for ) is a cycle of the smallest cardinality for 
is complete and transitive. Notice that if (x, y) ∈ P (R P ) where R P is the weak Pareto domination defined above, then it never occurs that (y, x) ∈ P (R B ). Hence, condition (A) in Proposition 6 is vacuously satisfied. Furthermore, if (x, y) ∈ Γ and (y, z) ∈ Γ, then (x, z) ∈ P (R B ) by transitivity of R B , and hence (z, x) / ∈ P (R P ). Therefore, condition (B) in Proposition 6 is also met. We can conclude that the the lexicographic composition P (R Often an equity criterion dichotomizes allocations into equitable and non-equitable ones. In such a case, we can define a complete and transitive binary relation R 2 as follows: for all x, y ∈ R mn + , (x, y) ∈ R 2 if and only if x is equitable or y is not equitable. Note that from this definition, (x, y) ∈ P (R 2 ) if and only if x is equitable and y is not equitable. Moreover, in this case, R 2 has at most two indifference classes. Hence, the condition (B) in Proposition 6 is irrelevant because for all x, y, z ∈ R mn + , (x, y) ∈ Γ and (y, z) ∈ Γ cannot occur together. Therefore, we have the following corollary. 
Corollary 3 Let
As an example of application of the above corollary, we present the lexicographic composition of the Pareto domination and the binary relation based on egalitarianequivalence that was studied in Tadenuma (2005) . 
Lexicographic Composition of Multiple Choice Functions
In this section, we study the procedure β to compose multiple criteria, namely, we first choose the set of maximal elements for the first binary relation R 1 , and then from this set we select its subset of maximal elements for the second binary relation R 2 , and iterate this procedure until the last binary relation R M . Formally, the procedure is represented by the choice function
In contrast to procedure α, procedure β provides non-empty outcomes under very mild conditions. Indeed, if each of the original criteria, P (R 1 ), . . . , P (R M ), does not have a cycle, then C P (R M ) · · · C P (R 1 ) (S) = ∅ for every S ∈ X . However, even if there exists a cycle S for P (R 2 ), C P (R 2 ) C P (R 1 ) (S) = ∅ holds as long as P (R 1 ) is acyclic and P (R 1 ) ranks at least one pair in S, and eliminate at least one alternative from C P (R 1 ) (S). A similar observation holds for every R m , m = 3, . . . , M . The following result, which was shown in Houy (2007) , provides a necessary and sufficient condition for C P (R M ) · · · C P (R 1 ) to satisfy non-emptiness.
Non-Emptiness if and only if for every m ∈ {1, . . . , M }, and for every cycle
(x 1 , . . . , x K ) ⊆ X for P (R m ), there exist m < m and k, ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that (x k , x ) ∈ P (R m ).
Proof. See Houy (2007, Theorem 2).
Comparing Propositions 3 and 7, we can see that if C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) satisfies nonemptiness (or equivalently,
satisfies non-emptiness as well. In other words, when we compose lexicographically two criteria for decision making, it is more difficult to guarantee non-empty choices under procedure α than under procedure β.
The following example shows that the converse of Corollary 5 does not hold true.
Example 6 Let R P be the weak Pareto domination, and let R F be defined as in Example 1. As noted above, R P is quasi-transitive and R F is transitive. Hence, for every finite set S ∈ R m + , C P (R P ) (S) = ∅, and C P (R F ) (C P (R P ) (S)) = ∅. However, there exists a cycle for P (R P , R F ) (Tadenuma, 2002) , and hence C P (R P ,R F ) does not satisfy non-emptiness. The same result holds for the other criteria given in Example 4, namely C P (R H ) C P (R P ) and C P (R E ) C P (R P ) satisfy non-emptiness whereas C P (R H ,R P ) and C P (R E ,R P ) do not.
We now examine the choice consistency properties of the lexicographic composition of multiple choice functions. First, we show a basic relationship between the choice functions derived from procedures α and β. It also implies Corollary 5 above.
Lemma 1 For every
Our next proposition shows a necessary and sufficient condition for C P (R M ) · · · C P (R 1 ) to satisfy Contraction Consistency. It is interesting to see that the condition requires a certain relationship among any three alternatives in terms of the decompositions of P (R 
Proposition 8 Assume that
, which contradicts the fact that Y is one of the cycles with the smallest cardinality. Thus,
, it must be true that
Then there exist m 1 < n 1 and y
By the assumption, we have (y
Then, a similar argument shows that there exist y
Repeating the above argument, we obtain a sequence (y
Since T is finite, there exists such that y = y k for some k < . This contradicts the acyclicity of P (R 
does not satisfy Contraction Consistency. Now let us prove that if C P (R M ) · · · C P (R 1 ) satisfies Non-Emptiness and Contraction Consistency, then,
The following example shows that even if C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) satisfies Non-Emptiness and Contraction Consistency, or equivalently,
) is acyclic and C P (R 1 ,R 2 ) satisfies Non-Emptiness and Contraction Consistency. However,
This is a violation of Contraction Consistency. In contrast to the results on Contraction Consistency, requiring Non-Emptiness and Path Independence for C P (R M ) · · · C P (R 1 ) is equivalent to requiring the same conditions for C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 9
The following three statements are equivalent. 
It follows from the equivalence of 1 with 2 that C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) satisfies Path Independence.
satisfies Non-Emptiness and Path Independence. Since Path Independence implies Contraction Consistency, it follows from Proposition 8 that
satisfies Non-Emptiness and Path Independence.
To illustrate this result, let us go back to Examples 1, 2 and 3. We have shown that C P (R F ,R P ) , C P (R H ,R P ) , and C P (R E ,R P ) satisfy Non-Emptiness and Path Independent. Then, by Proposition 9, we can conclude that C P (R P ) C P (R F ) , C P (R P ) C P (R H ) , and C P (R P ) C P (R E ) also satisfy Non-Emptiness and Path Independent.
Order Independence of Lexicographic Compositions
This section investigates under what conditions the outcomes of each choice procedure are independent of the order of lexicographic applications of multiple criteria. The next result, which is based on Lemma 1, shows that if procedure α satisfies order independence, then it always chooses the set of alternatives that are maximal for every criterion.
Define the choice function
). Hence, by the definition of P (R
As in the case of the efficiency-equity trade-off, if x is superior to y according to one criterion where as y is better than x by another criterion, then the best choice from {x, y} must depend on which criterion we should take first. Hence, in order for the final choice to be independent of the order of application of the two criteria, such conflict cannot arise. The following result formalizes this observation.
Proof. Necessity. Suppose that P (R 
whereas by the definition of P (R
. By the same argument, it can be shown that for every permutation π on {1,
Together with Proposition 10, this completes the proof.
If we also require non-emptiness as well as order independence, a further stronger condition must be called for.
..,R M ) satisfies Non Emptiness if and only if
Proof. Necessity. Assume that C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) = C P (R π(1) ,...,R π(M ) ) for every permutation π on {1, . . . , M } and C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) satisfies Non-Emptiness. By Proposition 11, P (R
) is asymmetric by definition, and it follows from Proposition 11 that
Notice that acyclicity of
) is sufficient but not necessary for nonemptiness of C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) . It is necessary for C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) to satisfy order independence as well as non-emptiness.
Asymmetry of
) is very demanding in economic allocation problems. It implies that any two criteria are never in contradiction. This requirement is rarely met when we are concerned with the efficiency and equity criteria.
The acyclicity of P (R
is also necessary for procedure β to be order independent. In fact, requiring order independence of procedure β is even more demanding than procedure α.
A necessary and sufficient condition for procedure β to satisfy order independence as well as Non-Emptiness was given in Houy (2007) .
Proof. See Houy (2007, Theorem 5) From Propositions 11, 12, and 13, we have the following corollary. (R π(1) ) for every permutation π on {1, . . . , M } and C P (R M ) · · · C P (R 1 ) satisfies Non-Emptiness, then C P (R 1 ,...,R M ) = C P (R π(1) ,...,R π(M ) ) = C P (R M ) · · · C P (R 1 ) = C P (R π(M ) ) · · · C P (R π(1) ) = C P (R 1 )∪···∪P (R M ) = C P (R 1 ) ∩ · · · ∩ C P (R M ) for every permutation π on {1, . . . , M }
The following example shows that order independence and non-emptiness of procedure β is strictly more demanding than those of procedure α. Let X = {x, y, z}, R (x, y) , (y, z)}, and hence, C P (R 1 ,R 2 ) = C P (R 2 ,R 1 ) . However, C P (R 2 ) C P (R 1 ) ({x, y, z}) = {x, z} whereas C P (R 1 ) C P (R 2 ) ({x, y, z}) = {x}.
Conclusion
Social or individual decision making often involves multiple criteria. Lexicographic applications of the multiple criteria seem natural and reasonable ways to make decisions in such contexts. However, there are at least two distinct procedures to lexicographically apply two (social or individual) preference relations, as studied in this paper. Procedure α constructs the lexicographic composition of multiple binary relations, and then selects its maximal elements while procedure β first selects the set of maximal elements for the first binary relation, and then chooses from that set its maximal elements for the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the M th binary relation.
There are indeed essential differences between these two procedures. First, procedure α, being a more deliberate way, often ends up with empty choices, whereas procedure β, being simpler and more intuitive, provides final choices as long as each of the two original criteria itself does not have inconsistency. For instance, acyclicity of the original binary relations is sufficient for procedure β to be non-empty, but it is not so for procedure α. Precise necessary and sufficient conditions for non-emptiness have been given in Sections 4 and 5 of this paper.
Second, although procedure β scarcely becomes empty, it may fail a minimum requirement of choice-consistency, namely contraction consistency, even in the case where procedure α satisfies non-emptiness and this consistency property. In fact, procedure β satisfies contraction consistency only when it coincides with procedure α. Exactly when this happens has also been shown in Section 5. However, turning to path independence, which is stronger than contraction consistency, procedure β satisfies non-emptiness and this condition when and only when procedure α satisfies the same conditions. This requires that the lexicographic composition of multiple binary relations is quasi-transitive.
Third, the outcomes of procedure α are non-empty and independent of the order of applications of the multiple criteria if and only if the union of the original binary relations is acyclic. This is already a very strong requirement because it implies that there is no conflict between any two criteria. Still, it is not sufficient for procedure β to satisfy the same condition. We need an additional condition given in Section 6.
In reality, there are many observations of inconsistent social or individual choices. Such observations may be explained by the "gap" between procedures β and α. People may actually use the simpler approach, namely procedure β, which always gives some answers as long as the original criteria themselves do not contain contradiction, but which quite easily fails a very basic condition of choice-consistency. In order to avoid inconsistent choices, they need to take the more deliberate approach, namely procedure α. But then, it often fails to provide optimal choices. This is a fundamental dilemma between non-emptiness and choice-consistency.
We also observe cases of disagreement among individuals who respect the same list of criteria. They may be explained by differences in order of application of the multiple criteria by the individuals.
We hope that the present paper contributes in clarifying the "gap" between the two procedures of decision making by showing several distinct sets of conditions for non-emptiness, contraction consistency, path independence, or order independence of each procedure. It would be interesting to use these conditions to examine how the choice procedures with multiple criteria can explain social or individual choices in concrete problems.
